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Many mainstream accounts of the recent Taksim-Gezi park protests have 
made references to the so-called Arab Spring events in Middle Eastern and 
North African (MENA) countries.  Many asked the same question: Are the 
Taksim Protests Turkey’s Arab Spring? In this paper, we draw on David 
Harvey, distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography, to offer an 
alternative account to explain the events in Turkey.1    
The protests in Taksim started small: its initial aim was to stop developers 
from building a shopping-centre that was to be housed in a replica of a 
military barracks building demolished sixty years ago, resulting in the 
destruction of much of the Gezi Park, one of the last green spots in central 
Istanbul (Europe’s biggest city and the business capital of Turkey).  However, 
the character of the protests changed when the Turkish police attacked 
protesters with considerable violence, and what started as an environmental 
protest in Istanbul quickly turned into a nation-wide political demonstration 
 
1 In particular his 2012 book, Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban 
Revolution (Verso), and his 2008 New Left Review article, “THE RIGHT TO THE CITY”.  
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against the policies of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and his government.  
The protest rapidly gained support from a cross-section of society in Istanbul 
and other urban centres and became diversified.  However, the protests were 
generally led and dominated by young middle class professionals and 
university students, and their demands for access, freedom and a new kind of 
urban living remained at the centre of the events.  Issues related to the city 
and its quality of life dominated the protests.  
It is no coincidence that the demonstrations started and concentrated in 
Istanbul, the largest and the most developed urban centre in Turkey.  Istanbul 
is a unique example of contemporary urban development projects with the big 
urban transformation and regeneration projects.  It was in the 1980s, soon 
after the military coup in Turkey, the city witnessed the beginning of the 
neoliberal transformation and the celebration of property rights, in the same 
way with the similar transformations happened in other metropolitan centres, 
like New York, London, Madrid, etc.  
The metropolitan cities have now central significance in the whole system of 
capitalist surplus production.  David Harvey describes this as “it is the 
metropolis that now constitutes a vast common produced by the collective 
labor expended on and in the city.  The right to use that common must surely 
then be accorded to all those who have had a part in producing it.  This is, of 
course, the basis for the claim to the right to the city on the part of the 
collective laborers who have made it.  The struggle for the right to the city is 
against the powers of capital that ruthlessly feed upon and extract rents from 
the common life that others have produced.”2   
In this sense, the Taksim-Gezi protests share a common ground with a great 
many diverse social movements focusing on the urban question, from India 
 
2 “The right to the city is not an exclusive individual right, but a focused collective right.  It is 
inclusive not only of construction workers but also of all those who facilitate the reproduction 
of daily life: the caregivers and teachers, the sewer and subway repair men, the plummers and 
electricians, the scaffold erectors and crane operators, the hospital workers and the truck, bus, 
and taxi drivers, the restaurant workers and the entertainers, the bank clerks and the city 
administrators.” (Harvey, Rebel Cities, pp. 78 and 137)  
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and Brazil to China, Spain, Argentina and the US.3  Just a few months before 
the Taksim-Gezi protests started, David Harvey spoke about the urban origins 
of the social movements and referred to Istanbul, saying that “What do we see 
in Istanbul? Cranes, everywhere.“4    
 
Democracy and “representation” 
Some of those hasty proclamations of a “Turkish Spring” concentrate on 
Tayyip Erdogan’s increasingly anti-democratic and authoritarian ruling style, 
and compare Erdogan’s rule with Mubarak’s. A certain slogan evoked some 
sympathy in the crowd: “Taksim will become Tahrir!”   To them, the Taksim 
protests represent the next stage of the “Arab Spring”.5    
Since Erdogan prides himself on being a democratically elected leader with 
strong grassroots support, his critics now pose questions such as how to define 
majority in representative democracies and whether a regime can still be 
considered a representative democracy when it does not follow policies to 
serve the interests of the majority.  That is true that the 11 year long AKP rule 
has not led to the creation of a fair distribution of income, the benefits of huge 
economic success were not shared fairly and equally by all strata of the 
population, and as far as the Human Development Index is concerned Turkey 
 
3 This is in line with David Harvey's reworking of Marxist political theory places the city first 
and foremost, in terms of its position as a generator of capital accumulation, as opposed to the 
factory/ work place. Harvey explains this situation as “the concept of work has to shift from a 
narrow definition attaching to industrial forms of labor to the far broader terrain of the work 
entailed in the production and reproduction of an increasingly urbanized daily life”. Harvey 
also discusses how urbanization will play a key role in social conflicts of today. (Rebel Cities, 
p.138)    
4 “Urban Class Warfare: Are Cities Built for the Rich?”, SPIEGEL ONLINE, May 21, 2013, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/marxist-and-geographer-david-harvey-on-urban-
development-and-power-a-900976.html[accessed in August 2013]. 
 
5 “From Taksim and Rio to Tahrir, the smell of teargas”, 29 June 2013, 
http://roarmag.org/2013/06/from-tahrir-and-rio-to-taksim-the-smell-of-teargas/; “Turkey 
protests escalate, activists call for ‘revolution’”, 
http://www.euronews.com/2013/06/02/turkey-protests-escalate-activists-call-for-
revolution/, 2 June 2013. (both accessed in July 2013) 
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is still a very unequal country.6  Most of the policies of the AKP favour the new 
bourgeoisie, the extended middle and upper middle classes rather than the 
vast majority of the working people.  We agree with these observations. 
However, none of these observations are directly relevant in terms of whether 
the AKP regime represents the interests of majority in Turkey’s representative 
democracy.  
“Democracy” literally means “government (power) by the people.  Usually the 
word is employed to designate the parliamentary regimes which developed in 
Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century on the “British model.”7 A 
representative democracy is a system of government in which representatives 
are elected by popular vote. These representatives then poll their constituents 
on the various matters and represent them in the large meeting called the 
parliament.  Representative democracy is the basis of constitutional 
democracy existing in many Western countries.  All those countries which call 
themselves democratic have a representative system of democracy. It is 
suggested that this is the only form of democracy which is viable in the larger 
and more complex societies of today. Even though on principle, 
representatives are chosen by the people to act in their best interest, this does 
not mean that they necessarily act the way the people want them to in every 
circumstance.  Theoretically power rests with the elected representatives, but 
this is obviously not the case since the policies implemented by governments 
are for most part contrary to the interests of the working people, and almost 
always in line with the interests of the powerful big business.  This is a form of 
democracy but quite different from straight-up majority rule.  This is what 
Alexis de Tocqueville called the “dictatorship of the majority.”8    
 
 
6 http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TUR.html (accessed in August 2013) 
7 Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, “Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: 
A Dynamic Analysis”, The American Economic Review, 1998, pp. 139-156; Ernest Germain, 
Marxism and Democracy, Marxists’ Internet Archive, 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/mandel/1948/09/democracy.htm (accessed in July 2013) 
8 Morton J. Horwitz, “Tocqueville and the Tyranny of the Majority”, The Review of Politics, 
Volume 28, Issue 03, July 1966 , pp 293-307.  
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A system based on true democracy is participatory democracy, where 
members of the public are effectively members of the government by voting 
directly on all policies. However, this is considered unpractical and difficult to 
administer and as a result, most modern democracies are representative, and 
for most of the time the regimes exercise their hegemonic power moving 
between consent and coercion, which was once described by Antonio Gramsci 
as ‘half man, half beast’- Gramsci took this term over from Machiavelli as the 
image of power as a centaur, a necessary combination of consent and 
coercion.9    
Turkey’s Tayyip Erdogan has been, by far, the most popular politician in 
Turkey after winning three consecutive elections by increasing his majority: 
34 per cent in 2002, 47 per cent in 2007 and more than 50 per cent in 2011. 
His success and popularity is interlinked with Turkey’s economic 
development: Erdogan’s leadership coincided with an impressive growth spurt 
for Turkey which placed the country among the top ten emerging stars of the 
world alongside with the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa.  Turkey’s per capita income was tripled within a decade under 
Erdogan’s leadership.  Annual economic output of Turkish economy is at 
$10,000 per person, it is about the same level as Brazil or Mexico and has 
been growing at a steady pace.10   
Alongside with managing a growing economy, Erdogan’s government 
achieved some other significant successes during this period.  AKP regime has 
been dealing effectively with the coup leaders of Turkey’s recent troubled past.  
A large number of generals were arrested, and one in three generals is now in 
prison.  It was also under his leadership that significant steps were taken to 
calm the decades-long violent conflict with the country’s significant Kurdish 
 
9 Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations,  edited by Stephen Gill, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.52. 
10 What has impressed many analysts over the past 10 years is the broad nature of Turkey’s 
econom ic development.  The industrial and services sectors have expanded along side 
tourism.( J Hawksworth, “The World in 2050: Beyond the BRICs – a broader look at 
emerging market growth prospects”, http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/world-
2050/pdf/world_2050_brics.pdf , accessed in August 2013) 
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minority.11  However, these successes have fuelled Erdogan’s sense of his own 
importance in Turkey’s recent economic rise.   As a result, it seems Tayyip 
Erdogan now believes that he is invincible. His excessive use of the state 
apparatus to establish his power base to such excess has led to accusations 
that he is indeed governing the country in the same autocratic style for which 
he had bitterly criticised the secular generals. After 11 years and three terms in 
power the result is the emergence of an increasingly authoritarian, religiously 
inspired and obsessively neoliberal system. It is based on a cleverly crafted 
hegemonic apparatus. This has been quite evident since 2011, with the start of 
violent repression of public protests, the jailing of journalists on suspicion of 
conspiring with terrorists, pressure being put upon newspaper owners to sack 
critical journalists; and the updating of the 1980s’ military regime’s anti-
terrorism laws.12 
All the above mentioned reactions and policies are characteristic of an 
administration that has spent too long in power and become far too confident 
about its capacity to maintain electoral power. Therefore, perhaps the current 
conflict – which has found its most powerful expression in the Taksim Gezi 
Park protest of tens of thousands of young people – boils down more than 
anything else to a style of ruling, the style of a leader who is increasingly 
intolerant of dissent. He gets angry too easily and reverts to his scrappy street 
fighter self.  As his regime provides material improvement in the lives of large 
sections of Turkey’s population, he becomes more and more arrogant and too 
sure of himself and his authoritarian ruling style.  He is acting as if the 
national power is his own personal power because the millions of people, 
almost 53 per cent in the most recent elections, in Turkey’s representational 
democracy had given their power to his party.  These are all aspects of a 
regime becoming increasingly undemocratic and arrogant. But still none of 
these justify to put the events in Turkey in the same category with the so-
called Arab Spring countries.  Despite the obvious “Tahrir feel” of Taksim, one 
 
11 “Amending Turkish Constitution for Kurdish Question”, 21 March 2013, 
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/positionpapers/2013/03/2013336372537622.htm (accessed 
in July 2013)     
 
12 Bulent Gokay, “Ragip Zarakolu, human rights symbol in modern Turkey”, OpenDemocracy, 
11 February 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/bulent-gokay/ragip-zarakolu-human-
rights-symbol-in-modern-turkey 
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must acknowledge that the significant differences are substantial. To start 
with, Mubarak was a dictator, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is an elected prime 
minister.  More importantly, Arab uprisings were mass events preceded by 
massive economic crises, while protest movement in Turkey is mainly a 
middle-class movement, mostly about young educated people defending 
lifestyle matters.  Turkish protestors were, in general, better educated 
professionals and university students from reasonably well-off families, and 
they are better connected through technology.  This is the new middle class of 
an emerging powerhouse.  They are protesting about quality of life, about 
future opportunities, and freedom of expression.13       
 
The mainstream terminology used by the Western media and experts, and 
shared by some Left/ Liberal accounts make the comparisons between Taksim 
and Tahrir Square referring to the ability of the street to topple a government.  
Some even claimed that “the Gezi Park resistance is a [revolutionary] turning 
point for the people of Turkey. After many decades they feel their power 
again”.14  However tempting, we believe such comparisons represent a gross 
over-simplification based on a range of superficial similarities many of which 
ignore the class analysis of the events.  The political-economy background of 
the events in Turkey is very different from that of its war-torn Arab neighbors. 
Turkey’s protests are also very different from the discontent in some of its 
European neighbors, such as Greece and Spain where weak economies have 
brought the unemployed youth out onto the streets.   
 
It is clear that the riot police in Turkey has employed a massive amount of 
force against these protestors, though it is not very different from Spanish, 
Italian, Greek, and British police tactics which we witnessed during the same 
weeks when hundreds of thousands of protestors walked against their crisis-
ridden governments’ austerity policies. In those European countries 
comparable levels of police force were employed, with the same instruments -- 
 
13 “Turkish protesters are young, liberal and mad at PM, poll says”, 
http://www.france24.com/en/20130605-turkey-protesters-istanbul-taksim-park-anger-
erdogan, 5 June 2013.   
14 I. Zekeriya Alman, “Turkey: ‘Occupy Gezi’ -- Istanbul’s red-green uprising; Right to the City 
movement and the Turkish summer”, http://links.org.au/node/3373, 2 June 2013.  
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tear gas, water cannons and plastic bullets-- to pacify the protesters and 
control the angry crowd. However, none of these European events were consi-
dered as a British, Greek or Spanish “Spring”!  
 
Undoubtedly, the two events, Turkey’s and Egypt’s, started and centred in two 
symbolic squares- Tahrir and Taksim; just like Tahrir Square Taksim has 
become a strong reminder of the power of public space; a number of normally 
rigorously competing football fans unified in their opposition to their 
governments’ policies leaving aside their  historical differences to defend 
“their city”; protesters demanded the resignation of the rulers in both cases; 
and the police responded harshly both in Tahrir and Taksim squares.15  But 
similarities end here.  Still, a growing number of articles in the mainstream 
media focused mainly on Turkish government’s Islamism and the presence of 
secular groups within the demonstrations, presenting Turkey’s protests yet 
another example of an Oriental Muslim dictator oppressing his mostly secular 
subjects.   “Islamists in power and secular, modern Turkey is in the streets and 
squares” says one such account.16  These interpretations tend to simplify 
complex and multi-layered events inyo gratifying morality tales about 
Western democratic secularists versus conservative Islamists.17  Such an 
interpretation is too ethnocentric, in the sense that those who look like us are 
“good guys”, those who look/ and dress less like us are “bad guys”.  Such 
presentations have a tendency to see the Muslims only in clichés, and  run the 
risk of creating a cultural caricature.18   
 
15 A poll published in the Hurriyet Daily News revealed that 70 percent of the protesters 
insisted they did not “feel close” to any political party. (given in “In Istanbul’s Heart, Leader’s 
Obsession, Perhaps Achilles’ Heel”, New York Times, 7 June 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/08/world/europe/in-istanbuls-taksim-square-an-
achilles-heel.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) 
 
16 “From Tahrir to Taksim”, http://www.ericlee.info/blog/?p=763, 12 June 2013. 
 
17 ‘the fact that in Turkey, Egypt or Tunisia an “Islamic republic” with its own peculiarities 
was not born, as in Iran, is the reason for disorder and conflicts’, says Daniele Scalea in 
http://www.4thmedia.org/2013/06/23/from-tahrir-to-taksim-the-carousel-of-revolt-in-the-
mediterranean-periphery/ (accessed in July 2013) 
 
18 Such Eurocentric prejudices had emerged over centuries, supported by the writings of 
leading Western thinkers/ writers.  Immanuel Kant, for instance, divided humans into four 
racial categories, set apart from each other by differences in natural disposition.  “Humanity”, 
he writes, is “at its greatest perfection in the race of the whites”. (in E.C. Eze, Race and 
Enlightenment: A Reader, Blackwell, 1997, pp.47, 55 and 63)  Similarly, James Mill, great 
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Brazil, Turkey, (and Chile) -- Protests Follow Economic Success 
It would be more appropriate to make comparisons between the 
demonstrations in Turkey and the protests in Brazil, which started just a 
couple of weeks after the protests in Taksim.  One might even include the 
student protests in Chile in 2011 here19. Despite their significant differences, 
in particular in terms of the reactions from the Turkish and Brazilian 
authorities, both Turkish and Brazilian protesters seemed to be coming from 
similar class backgrounds and  ages, and they were making similar demands 
of democracy in similarly innovative ways.20   
There are a number of other comparisons that might be made of Turkey and 
Brazil, (and Chile too): both are emerging powers with booming economies 
and dynamic, democratically elected governments;  both countries are 
exerting considerable influence in the regions around them, and often being 
cited as models; both  have been developing global ambitions.  Brazil is one of 
the BRICS, B of the BRICS, and the largest economy in the Western 
hemisphere after the US.  Turkey is at a critical junction of Europe and the 
Middle East, and is a key geopolitical player in the Balkans, Central Asia and 
the Middle East.  Both countries pull considerable weight in affairs far beyond 
their own borders.  
There are, of course, some divergences too. The immediate, explicit issues 
which led to the protests are not exactly the same, but similarly urban: the 
government’s plan to redevelop Gezi Park, an urban park next to Istanbul's 
 
British philosopher and historian of the 19th century, wrote a five-volume history of India to 
demonstrate how deficient the Indians are in governance, science, philosophy, art, and 
technology.  Today other Western writers repeat a similar line. Niall Ferguson, for instance, 
writes, “Without the spread of British rule around the world”, colonised people, such as 
Chinese and Indians, would not have parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, incorrupt 
government, and individual freedoms. (Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the 
British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power, New York: Basic Books, 2003)     
19 Massive protests of August 2011 or the Chilean Education Conflict(as labelled in Chilean 
media), a series of ongoing student-led protests across Chile, demanding a new framework for 
education in the country.  Beyond the specific demands regarding education, there is a feeling 
that the protests reflect a "deep discontent" among some parts of society with Chile's high 
level of inequality. Recently, following the start of the protest movement in Brazil, mostly 
peaceful demonstrations started again across the country to demand education reform. 
20 “Peace is over, Turkey is here?” was one placard in Sao Paolo. (Reuters, 14 June 2013) 
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Taksim Square in Turkish case, it was very much "a right to the city" type of a 
movement; an increase in public transport fares in Sao Paulo in Brazilian 
case- for free bus fares and under the slogan "Copa pra quem?" (Whose Cup?) 
tens of thousands of young Brazilians took to the streets, occupied and set-up 
neighborhood assemblies to reclaim their city from neoliberal forces.  The 
governments are not at all alike, Turkey having a long-serving popular leader 
who heads a conservative Islamist party; and Brazil with a relatively new 
president,a former leftist guerrilla who was imprisoned and tortured in the 
1970s during military dictatorship, heading a leftist popular movement.  But 
there is a very important similarity: they are both representative democracies. 
Not only that, each country has a powerful military that had been involved in 
politics in the not too distant past.  But now, both countries have managed to 
put their armies in the barracks, and therefore their democracies considered 
quite stable.  Based on their world-class model of economic progress, 
development and reasonably stable democracies, both countries are often 
cited as examples of previously underdeveloped countries able to overcome 
their troubled political past.   In this sense, there is no Turkey Spring as there 
is no Brazilian Spring.  This is not Tunisia, Egypt or Libya.  Democratically 
elected governments in Turkey and in Brazil are far more resilient and their 
leaders far more popular and secure in their power than the North African 
dictators swept away by the events of 2011.  Despite his increasingly 
authoritarian policies, Turkey’s Erdogan still remains immensely popular 
among the country’s poor and deeply religious majority.   
However, as can be seen in many “democratic” countries, democratically 
elected leaders often come to have an inflated sense of knowing better than 
their citizens what is best for their citizens, and they do have a tendency to 
favour prestigious infrastructure projects rather than what affects most 
peoples’ daily lives.  This is exactly what is at stake both in Turkey and Brazil.  
So, in one sense, both in Brazil and Turkey, participatory democracy was 
forcefully diluted among an orgy of neoliberal mega-projects, generating 
dubious profits for a small elite in their respective countries.  All this also 
created an inflated self-image around these mega structures for the leaders.  
In Turkish case, it is the ruling AKP’s collusion with powerful business 
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interests in the so –called re-development of Istanbul.  In Brazilian case, it 
revolves around massive public funds for the hosting of the World Cup and 
the Olympics.21  This is common feature of capitalist system in the context of 
so called urban re-development and cultural investment in and around many 
modern metropolitan centres.  This is justified by an economic argument 
around the importance to capitalism of land, rent and speculation more so 
than straightforward production.  “Over the past 30-40 years, where cities try 
to brand themselves and sell a piece of their history. What is the image of a 
city? Is it attractive to tourists? Is it trendy? So a city will market itself.”22  
There are many passages describing this situation in David Harvey’s Rebel 
Cities, such as: 
there is always a strong social and discursive element at work in 
the construction of such causes for extracting monopoly rents, 
since there will be, at least in many people’s minds, no other place 
than London, Cairo, Barcelona, Milan, Istanbul, San Francisco, or 
wherever, in which to gain access to whatever it is that is 
supposedly unique to such places.23 
Or: 
 
Much of the corruption that attaches to urban politics relates to 
how public investments are allocated to produce something that 
looks like a common but which promotes gains in private asset 
values for privileged property owners.  The distinction between 
urban public goods and urban commons is both fluid and 
dangerously porous.  How often are development projects 
subsidized by the state in the name of the common interest when 
the true beneficiaries are a few landholders, financiers, and 
developers?24    
The recent events in Turkey and Brazil are examples to how authorities 
respond to the crowd when their “grand” projects of neoliberal restructuring 
were challenged by their citizens, many of whom may have voted for the ruling 
 
21 There is a background to this: since 2008, the ongoing pacification programmes in Rio’s 
favelas which entail a neoliberal urbanized approach to social and class warfare through the 
application o0f a range of different public policies to “troubled” neighbourhoods, such as 
special police units (Pacification Police Units, UPP) patrolling favelas to help broker peace 
being warring drug traffickers.   
22 Interview with David Harvey: Rebel Cities & Urban Resistance Part II, 7 January 2013, 
http://www.zcommunications.org/contents/190562, accessed in August 2013. 
23 Harvey, Rebel Cities, p. 103. 
24 Harvey, Rebel Cities, p.78. 
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parties.  No representative democracy is fully democratic, and the fact that the 
way the Turkish, Brazilian and Chilean rulers’ not fully representing the 
demands of their populations is not very unique either.  Even in the UK, which 
is generally considered one of the best examples of the Western parliamentary 
democracy, just over ten years ago in February - March 2003, Tony Blair’s 
Labour government utterly ignored huge demonstrations, largest ever in the 
history of his country, including the two-million strong anti-war protestors in 
London, and pressed on with a disastrous war policy against Iraq.  The 
surveys of that time, March 2003, pointed out that fifty-five per cent of 
Britons agreed that the London marchers were right because the war was 
delivered on false pretences and delivered little other than bloodshed.  There 
were also global protests against the war in Iraq: three million people 
protested on the streets of Rome, considered as the largest anti-war rally ever 
in human history, and anything between 10 and 30 million in other 
metropoles around the world.  Still, none of this made any serious impact on 
the decisions of the Blair government regarding starting a disastrous war in 
Iraq.  The Western governments’ refusal to listen to the anti-war protesters 
was such a dramatic illustration of the limits of parliamentary democracy, but 
also such events shaped a strong and growing taste for direct action, one can 
find many examples from the anti-Vietnam War actions in the 1970s to the 
occupy movements of the 2008-13.25        
Until recently, Turkey, Chile and Brazil were the envy of much of the world.  
Their economic rise has been spectacular.  These were among the fastest 
developing countries on earth.  All three countries have seen a strong period of 
mass growth, economically and population-wise.  Sustained growth brought in 
enough tax revenues to improve both education and health spending.  The 
boom also allowed the governments to increase minimum wages significantly 
without any apparent damage to employment.  As a result of governments’ 
 
25 Guardian/ICM poll, in February 2003, shows that at least one person from 1.25 million 
households in Britain went on Saturday's anti-war march in London, confirming estimates 
that between one million and two million people went on the march.  The poll shows it is the 
prime minister's personal standing rather than the Labour party which has suffered the wrath 
of anti-war voters. Labour's standing is down four points from 43% last month to 39% this 
month but the government still maintains a healthy eight-point lead over the Conservatives. 
(The Guardian, Tuesday 18 February 2003, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2003/feb/18/politics.iraq)  
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extension of welfare, health and educational provision, a large section of 
people in Turkey, and Brazil, has gained access to better public services.26   
If we try to make a connection between these economic success stories and the 
recent protest movements, first observation will be about how a strong cycle of 
economic enrichment over the past ten years has changed the public’s 
expectations of its politicians.  Since Turkish, Chilean and Brazilian regimes 
achieved sustained growth and employment, delivering on growth and 
employment is no longer enough to satisfy the majority of their populations.  
Citizens increasingly hold their leaders accountable to improve the quality of 
public services, and to expand the boundaries of participatory democracy, and 
listen to their concerns closely.  One therefore can consider the protests in 
Chile, Turkey and Brazil as a symptom of radically shifting demands, driven 
mostly by these emerging power houses’ economic success.  These are 
democratic protest movements in societies experiencing rapid change where 
the public’s demand for better services and more democracy at local as well as 
national levels grow at a faster pace than their governments’ ability to provide.   
Despite the multiplication of the slogans and emerging chaos about the aims 
of the protesters, it is important to note that the protest of both Turkey’s and 
Brazil’s urban youth are first and foremost a response to the ruling regimes’ 
grandiose neoliberal projects of urban transformation, gentrifying schemes, 
with the aim of creating high-tech malls, skyscrapers, and expensive giant 
high-tec stadiums.  All this is part of “the violent neoliberal attack upon the 
public provision of social public goods over the last thirty years or more”.27   
It is also important to note that the educated urban youth is at the forefront of 
the resistance to such neoliberal assault. To many analysts, young people’s 
role in the protest movements came as a surprise because young people had 
been identified as apolitical and individualistic for decades.  With the recent 
protests movements in the summer of 2013, the urban youth proved that they 
cared about how current policies of their governments are affecting their life, 
 
26 http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2013/07/08/130708ta_talk_surowiecki, 
http://theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=10040, 
http://www.globalenvision.org/library/3/1377 (all accessed in July 2013) 
27 Harvey, Rebel Cities, p. 85. 
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urban space, their country and their fellow citizens, and that they are willing 
to protest resiliently.    
Youth and urban “warfare”   
Within neoliberal narratives, youth are mostly defined as a 
consumer market, a drain on the economy, or stand for trouble. 
… Young people increasingly have become subject to an 
oppressive disciplinary machine that teaches them to define 
citizenship through the exchange practices of the market and to 
follow orders and toe the line in the face of oppressive forms of 
authority.  They are caught in a society in which almost every 
aspect of their lives is shaped by the dual forces of the market 
and a growing police state.  The message is clear: Buy/ sell/ or 
be punished.28 
 
Much like the protesters in Turkey, most demonstrators in Brazil have jobs 
and are well educated.  They are mainly from the country's growing middle 
classes, which government figures show has ballooned by some 40 million 
over the past decade amid a commodities-driven economic boom.  Unlike 
countries such as Greece and Spain where weak economies have brought the 
unemployed out onto the streets, the discontent in Brazil and Turkey has been 
created by strong economic growth.29 As standards of living have risen, so 
have people’s expectations for better services and wider participation in 
decision-making.  Brazilian and Turkish youth are not protesting because they 
want to overthrow a dictator or are angry about massive unemployment. They 
are upset, and rightly so, about the priorities and the manner in which these 
have been pursued – without sufficient consultation - by their governments.  
 
28 Henry A. Giroux, “The Violence of Organized Forgetting”, Truthout, 22 July 2013, 
http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/17647-the-violence-of-organized-forgetting 
(accessed in July 2013) 
29 Anthony Faiola and Paula Moura, “Middle-class rage sparks protest movements in Turkey, 
Brazil, Bulgaria and beyond”, The Washington Post, 28 June 28 2013, 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-28/world/40250885_1_turkey-new-
government-arab-spring. (accessed in August 2013) 
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They demand the right to participate in the planning and distribution of their 
country’s wealth. In both countries, more and more people demand the right 
to be heard and to be involved, linked to the feeling that they aren't really able 
to get involved.  They want the right to determine their own futures.  They are 
no longer prepared to be talked down to by the government.30  The protests 
can in one sense be read as the articulation by those involved of what a fair 
and just world might be.31 Turkish and Brazilian youth, rejecting the 
neoliberal notion that democracy and markets are the same, have not only 
addressed some of the current injustices while reclaiming their urban space, 
but they also started to produce new ideas with a new and very imaginative 
political language.   
The whole process is almost a textbook case to what David Harvey describes 
as “the urbanization of capital”: 
The reproduction of capital passes through processes of 
urbanization in myriad ways.  But the urbanization of capital 
presupposes the capacity of capitalist class powers to dominate 
the urban process.  This implies capitalist class domination not 
only over state apparatuses,… but also over whole populations – 
their lifestyles as well as their labor power, their cultural and 
political values as well as their mental conceptions of the world. 
That level of control does not come easily, if at all.  The city and 
the urban process that produces it are therefore major sites of 
political, social, and class struggles.32   
 
In the final analysis, we believe that the protest movements in the urban areas 
of Turkey and Brazil represent the direct responses of youth in the search of “a 
different way of urban living from that which was being imposed upon them 
by capitalist developers and the state”.33  In our view, the demonstrations can 
be connected to a wider discussion developed by David Harvey around “the 
right to the city” which is a right to democratic control over the process of 
 
30 James Surowiecki, “Middle Class Militants”, The New Yorker, 8 July 2013, 
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2013/07/08/130708ta_talk_surowiecki. 
(accessed in August 2013) 
31 “Turkish protesters reject neo-liberalism not Islamism”, ahramonline, 4 June 2013, 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/73116/World/Region/Interview-Turkish-
protesters-reject-neoliberalism-.aspx. (accessed in August 2013) 
32 David Harvey, Rebel Cities, p.65. 
33 Harvey, Rebel Cities, p.21 
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urbanization.  The specific aims of the protesters in Istanbul and Sao Paolo, to 
keep a green space as a public park and to defend affordable transportation 
fees for urban public, are in a general sense their attempt to reclaim their city, 
their urban space.    Whatever the initial results, or lack of specific gains, of 
the recent protests, Turkish and Brazilian youth have already created “a 
critical mass of political energy” for a “struggle to fashion an alternative to 
globalisation that does not trade on monopoly rents in particular or cave in to 
multinational capitalism in general”, and initiated “a platform for what an 
alternative urbanization project might look like”.34  
 
 
 
 
(a shorter version of this article was published by openDemocracy, 26 August 
2013)   
* “Rebel Cities” is a reference to David Harvey’s 2012 book, Rebel Cities: From 
the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (Verso, 2012). 
 
**Bulent Gokay is a Professor of International Relations and  
Farzana Shain is a Professor of Sociology of Education, both at Keele 
University, UK. 
 
34 Matt Mahon, “Interview with David Harvey”, The White Review, May 2012, 
http://www.thewhitereview.org/interviews/interview-with-david-harvey/ (accessed in 
August 2013); Harvey, Rebel Cities, pp. 88 and 111. 
